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1.
The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A
10 at 18.
2.
A similar situation occurred when President Reagan
decided to prohibit American made equipment or technology
from being used in constructing Russia's natural gas pipeline.
The United States government ordered a French subsidiary of Dresser Industries, Inc., Dallas, Tex., not to
ship three compressors manufactured in France but of American design.
The French government demanded that Dresser's
subsidiary honor French contracts with the Russians and
ship the equipment.
On August 26, 1982, the compressors
were loaded aboard a vessel bound for the Soviet Union.
The
Commerce Department immediately announced trade sanctions
against Dresser's subsidiary, barring it from receiving
further American products or technology.
No.

Additional complications occur when

jurisdiction is

claimed over foreign corporations not present within the
borders of the nation attempting to assert authority.

The

United States has sought to extend its antitrust law in
precisely that manner, a practice marked by bitter inter3

national debate.

One foreign tribunal has characterized

American claims to

jurisdiction as

invasion of sovereignty." 4

"excessive and

.

.

.

an

Other countries have reacted

with a variety of countermeasures ranging from diplomatic
protest

5

to legislation designed to subvert American at-

tempts at foreign discovery and,
American judgments abroad.

in some cases, nullify

6

By no means is criticism of United States regulatory
7
policy limited to antitrust matters.
Attempts to regulate
or investigate companies domiciled and operating completely
outside the United States by the Securities & Exchange

3.
See generally Comment, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and
the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1247 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment]; Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. Law. 697 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Pettit & Styles]; Ongman, "Be no Longer a
Chaos": Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L. Rev. 733
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Ongman]; Gordon, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Economic Laws, 14 Int'l Law. 155
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]; Comment, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust
Litigation, 88 Yale L.J. 612 (1979); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1963);
Jones, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Antitrust:
An International "Hot Potato", 11 Int'l Law. 415 (1977).
4.
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
[1978] A.C. 547, 631.
5.
See, e.g., British protests, reprinted in International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Conference, 404, 579, 582 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ILA].
6.
E.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll.
7.
See, e.g., Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of
American Economic Regulation:
The Case of Securities Law,
17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 315 (1976).

Commission, 8 the Federal

Trade Commission 9 and the Federal

10

Maritime Commission
and

judicial rebuke.

have also provoked

foreign diplomatic

11

This comment will outline

the international response

to extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
law,

focusing primarily on foreign statutory enactments.

Following a brief review of United States antitrust legislation, American case law will be analyzed.

The next

section of the inquiry will consist of an examination of
the so-called "blocking statutes" of eight major United
States trading partners.

Finally, alternative solutions to

the conflict will be outlined.

II.

United States Antitrust Law

The antitrust law of the United States has been described as "perhaps the most fundamental and pervasive
adoption of the competitive system to be found in the national laws of any country." 1

2

The Sherman Act 1

core of American antitrust law.
contract, combination in the form

Section 1 forbids

is the
"[e]very

of trust or otherwise or

conspiracy in restraint of trade or
several states,

3

commerce among the

or with foreign nations. "

14

Section 2 bans

8.
E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
9.
E.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-aMousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.D.C. 1979).
10.
E.g., Re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping
Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
11.
E.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., [1978] A.C. 547.
12.
C. Fulda & W. Schwartz, Regulation of International
Trade and Investment 17 (1970).
13.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
14.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added).
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missal

of

the

complaint.

abroad,

however,

15.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
16.
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17.
15 U.S.C. 99 8-11 (1976).
18.
15 U.S.C. 99 61-65 (1976).
19.
See Pettit & Styles, supra note 3, at 699.
20.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
21.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
22.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549
597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
See Comment, supra note 3, at 1247.
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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man

Act was

interpreted as ineffective when applied to acts

committed outside the United States,
illegal in

The Sher-

particularly when not

the country in which they occurred.

Justice

Holmes wrote:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where

the

act

is done

.

.

..

For

another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according
to its own notions rather than those of the
place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the
authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
The foregoing consideration would lead in
case of doubt to a construction of any statute
as confined in its operations and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has
general and legitimate power.
All legislation
28
is prima facie territorial.
Two years later, the "territorial"

approach taken in

American Banana was qualified by the Court's decision in
United States v. American Tobacco Co.

29

The defendant

American corporation executed an agreement in England

to

allocate tobacco markets and

thereby reduce competition in

the

the agreement was reached out-

United States.

side

Although

the United States,

that both

the Court nonetheless determined

interstate and foreign

trade were affected

in

violation of the Sherman Act.
American Tobacco was followed

in 1913 by United States
30

v.

Pacific & Artic Railway & Navigation Co.

Court upheld
several

28.
29.
30.

The Supreme

the indictment of an American corporation and

Canadian companies which had allegedly contrived

Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
228 U.S. 87 (1913).

to monopolize rail and steamship routes between Canada and
the United States.

The Court reasoned that to deny juris-

diction, "would put

the transportation route described in

the indictment out
United States."

of the control of either Canada or the

31

32

In Thompsen v. Cayser,

the court held

that an asso-

ciation of steamship companies, formed in London in order
to monopolize the carriage of goods between
States and South Africa,

was subject

The Court noted that, "the

to

the United

the Sherman Act.

combination affected the

foreign
'33

commerce of this country and was put into operation here."

In 1927, American Banana was further diluted by United
34

States v. Sisal Sales Corp.

In Sisal

the Supreme Court

affirmed an injunction issued under the Sherman Act and
section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act.

The defendants, sev-

eral American corporations and a Mexican company, pursuant
to an act by the Mexican legislature, conspired
lize

to monopo-

the importation of sisal into the United States.

tinguishing American Banana, Justice

Reynolds remarked

Disthat

although most of the conspiratorial acts took place outside
the United States, there were, nevertheless,

"forbidden

'3 5

results within

the United States."

The increased stress placed on "results" produced within the United States alluded to in Sisal was fully embraced
36

in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.
foreign aluminum ingot

producers agreed to fix prices and

allocate aluminum production.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
243
Id.
274
Id.
148
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U.S. 66 (1971).
at 88.
U.S. 268 (1927).
at 276.
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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to
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37.
Id. at 443.
38.
See Ongman, supra note 3, at 751 n.23.
39.
148 F.2d 416, 443-4 (2d Cir. 1945).
40.
Id.
41.
100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), final decree issued,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
42.
100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
For a resounding British judicial rebuke of the American decision,
see British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.).

132

Information Center,

Inc.

43

Swiss watch manufacturers and

United States subsidiaries were

their

cartel they had formed

ordered to dissolve a

through what was termed a "gentle-

man's agreement".

The cartel had the tacit approval of

Swiss government.

It restricted

the

the export of American

watches to Switzerland and to areas where the market for
Swiss watches was strong.

Restraints were also

imposed on

the export of watch parts and watchmaking machinery to the
United States.
The court found that

the cartel

violated section 1 of

the Sherman Act and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act by
unreasonably

restricting the manufacture,

of watches to the United States.
government to take
Justice caused

Threats

import and sale
by the Swiss
Court of

the case to the International

the United States Department of Justice to

request the American court to modify its order so as not to
interfere with Swiss internal economic policy.
Another line of cases, also
torial

pertaining

to extraterri-

application of American economic laws, has

erode the expansive reach permitted under the
doctrine".

begun to

"effects

The basis for these decisions is due process.
44

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
Court

set forth a "minimum contacts"

the Supreme

test which must be met
45

before

in personam jurisdiction can be asserted.

More

46

recently, in Shaffer v. Heitner,
the

requirement

that in a quasi

must exist between

the Court articulated
in rem proceeding, a nexus

the cause of action and the subject

property.

43.
44.
45.
46.

70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See U.S. Const. amend. V.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).

In addition to considerations of due process, some
observers recently note a more deferential stance by the
American

judiciary in applying United States antitrust law

abroad.

Decisions such as Timberlane Lumber Co.

v. Bank of

47
America
tion,

48

and Mannington Mills,
indicate that

Inc.

v. Congoleum Corpora-

courts are beginning to weigh prin-

ciples of international law and comity in their deliberations.
In Timberlane, an American lumber importer accused
defendant

of seeking

the

to monopolize trade in Honduran lumber.

The plaintiff also alleged that the

defendant had enlisted

the cooperation of a Honduran court

that granted

against Timberlane's Honduran subsidiaries.
case, Judge Choy found
the case

factually too

doctrine as a defense.
lane is,

however,

"embargoes"

49

In deciding the

the Honduran court's connection with
trivial to trigger the act of state
50

The significant feature of Timber-

the court's formulation of a three tiered

jurisdictional test,

to be applied when acts of foreign

sovereigns are interfused with alleged antitrust violations:
IT]he antitrust laws require in the first instance
that there be some effect -- actual or intended -on American foreign commerce before the federal
courts may legitimately exercise subject matter
jurisdiction under those statutes.
Second, a
greater showing of burden or restraint may be
necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present cognizable injury to
the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation
of

the

antitrust

laws

. .

.

. Third,

there

is

the additional question which is unique to the
international setting of whether the interests
of, and links to, the United States -- including
the magnitude of the effect on American commerce

47.
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
48.
595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
49.
"Embargo" is defined as a "court ordered attachment
registered with the Public Registry."
549 F.2d 597, 604-5
(9th Cir. 1976).
50.
549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976).

-- are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis those of
other nations, to justify
an assertion of extra5 1
territorial authority.
A similar approach was taken

in Mannington Mills.

The

plaintiff sought triple damages, alleging the defendant
fraudulently secured foreign patents and
trade by enforcing those

patents in other countries.

determining whether extraterritorial
exercised, the court set
based on Timberlane.

In

jurisdiction should be

forth a comparative relations test

The test expanded

factors weighed to ten,

restrained export

the number of

eight of which address transnational

52

issues.
The Seventh Circuit

tacitly acknowledged

the Timber-

lane and Mannington Mills tests in In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation.

53

In Uranium, Westinghouse Electric Corporation

51.
549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
52.
Those factors are:
1.
Degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy;
2.
Nationality of the parties;
3.
Relative importance of the alleged
violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4.
Availability of a remedy abroad and
the pendency of litigation there;
5.
Existence of intent to harm or affect
American commerce and its foreseeability;
6.
Possible effect upon foreign relations
if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7.
If relief is granted, whether a party
will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either
country or be under conflicting requirements
by both countries;
8.
Whether the court can make its order
effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be
acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10.
Whether a treaty with the affected
nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).
53.
617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).

accused the defendants of fixing world uranium prices and
attempting to divide global markets.

54

In upholding the

district court's assumption of jurisdiction, the
appeals found no abuse of discretion,
test was

the

proper standard and

56

test articulated in Timberlane as

pointed out that the jurisdictional
lized in

noting that the Alcoa

that Mannington Mills was

not the law of the Seventh Circuit.
the

55

The opinion dismissed
"obiter dicta" but

"rule of reason" uti-

Timberlane provides an adequate

to determine whether jurisdiction should
As the
ness

framework in which
be asserted.

57

courts slowly move toward greater aware-

federal

of international

ritorial

court of

law and comity in applying extrater-

jurisdiction in antitrust cases,

the United States

Department of Justice is also shifting its position.
1977,

In

the Department issued its Antitrust Guide for Inter-

national

Operations.

58

It

recommends that in considering

whether American antitrust laws should be enforced outside
the United States,

comity should be weighed

necessary interference with
foreign nations."

to "avoid un-

the sovereign interests of

5 9

The seeming trend

toward increased ethnocentricity by

Westinghouse had long term contracts to supply
54.
In 1964, the
domestic and foreign utilities with uranium.
In retaliaUnited States banned all imports of uranium.
tion, the governments of Canada, France, South Africa,
Australia and Great Britain approved measures designed to
strengthen their uranium industries which caused the price
per pound of uranium to rise from $6 in 1972 to $40 in 1976.
As a result, Westinghouse abrogated its utility contracts
The company
and claimed two billion dollars in damages.
used that amount as a foundation for a six billion dollar
triple damages action against the defendants.
617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980).
55.
617 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
56.
Id. at n.25.
57.
58.
Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
[1977-78
Guide for International Operations, reprinted in
Extra Edition] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 226 (1977).
Id. at 6-7.
59.

American courts

6 0

and the Department

by other nations as superficial.

of Justice is perceived

Several

United States

trading partners have enacted "blocking statutes".
ly,

these laws have a dual purpose.

First,

they

Typical-

seek to

circumscribe the ability of American litigants to acquire
evidence, particularly commercial documents.
are designed

to render enforcement

Secondly, they

of United States

judg-

ments abroad ineffective.

IV.

Foreign Statutory Enactments Designed to Block Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law

A.

The United Kingdom

The British consistently, and at times acrimoniously,
object to American attempts

to prejudice English

interests through "long arm" enforcement
commercial laws.

In 1980,

of United States

Parliament passed the

of Trading Interests Act 1980.61

It

trading

Protection

is the most extensive

attempt by any nation to prevent foreign assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Secretary for Trade,

the Act was promulgated

and reinforce the defenses of
attempts by other countries to
commercial policies

In the words of the British

the United Kingdom against
enforce their economic and

unilaterally on us."

Although the Act applies to
secret

to "reassert

62

all other nations, it is no

that it was fashioned principally

to

thwart encroach-

ments by the United States on British jurisdiction.

60.
Although the courts in Timberlane and Mannington Mills
articulated concern for issues of international law and comity,
no court has yet denied jurisdiction on those grounds.
61.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll, in
force, March 20, 1980.
62.
973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979).

Disputes between the
back at

two nations on the issue date

least thirty years.

In order to put the Protection

of Trading Interests Act 1980 into proper perspective,
brief review of the Anglo-American conflict
The genesis of
ping industry.
"conferences"

the

is instructive.

dispute centered around the ship-

Since 1909,

the British have permitted

(cartels) between

English point of view,

a

shipowners which, from the

increase efficiency and stability.

Conferences are exempt from British legislation designed

63

to

increase competition.
In sub-

In form, the American approach seems similar.
stance, a broad disparity exists.
1914 acknowledged the

The

Alexander Report of

desirability of cooperation between

shipowners and recommended that

conference systems

tially exempt from antitrust regulation.

The

be par-

Report was
64

adopted as

section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916,

authorizes the Federal Maritime Commission
all

liner conference agreements.

which

(FMC) to approve

Exemptions from antitrust

law are conferred with FMC approval.
On its face,

the

American procedure appears to be quite

reasonable, however, several systemic refinements have provoked conflict between
nations.

the United States and other maritime

First, American

case law has

extended the reach of

includ65
Addithe United States.

United States jurisdiction over foreign nationals,
ing those

located wholly outside

tionally, with respect

to shipping conferences,

the courts

See, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping,
63.
CMND No. 4337 at 115-46 (1970).
64.
U.S. Shipping Act, ch. 451 § 15, 39 stat. 733 (1916)
(current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1980)).
See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Con65.
ference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).

require

the FMC to consider antitrust issues more carefully
66

Secondly, a philosophical

before granting exemptions.

difference exists between English and American antitrust
remedies.

The British regard American antitrust triple
67

damage awards as penal.

Civil actions

to enforce trade
68

restriction

laws are virtually unknown in England.

American private litigant seeking triple

The

damages is perceived,

therefore, as an abnormal yet dangerous threat.

Thirdly,

American discovery rules are far more comprehensive than
British counterparts.

For

Antitrust Improvements Act

example, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
6 9

authorizes the

service of

"civil investigative demands" on individuals, corporations
or third

parties, including foreign nationals, not directly

under investigation.

Discovery of documents procured from

a non-party to a suit using the procedure, carries with it
the potential hazard for the producing party of antitrust
prosecution should the Department of Justice
of a violation in the discovered
Several
out.

information.

find evidence
70

instances of Anglo-American disagreement stand-

In 1952, a federal grand jury

investigated the foreign

66.
Volkswagengewerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 290 (1968).
67.
We regard the civil action -- I refer here
to triple damages -- as being penal rather than
compensatory, and consequently consider that in
international dealings at least these proceedings
should be subject to the limitations that we
would regard as appropriate to criminal proceedings.
John Nott, Hansard H.C., col. 1151 (1979), reprinted in
Huntley, The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980: Some
Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, 30
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 213, 220 (T980) (hereinafter cited as
Huntley].
68.
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (1958) as
incorporated into British law, might afford a private cause
of action, however, no English court has yet addressed the
issue.
69.
15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
70.
That possibility was recognized in Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1
All E.R.
434, 458-9.

petroleum industry.

Among the corporations examined was

the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company.

ordered the company not

The British government

to produce any of the documents

sought by the grand jury. 71
In 1960, a United States grand
focused on

the shipping industry.

jury investigation
It

72

prompted eleven na-

tions and over two hundred foreign shipowners

to dispute

the FMC's purported authority to require that documents,
not located

in the United States and concerning commercial

transactions occurring outside
with the FMC.

The

the United States,

be filed

British formally protested twice during
7 3

the investigation.
Attempts

to reconcile the opposing interests of

United States and other maritime
In

1964,

the

nations proved fruitless.

the British Minister of Transport introduced in

the House of Commons the Shipping Contracts and Commercial
Documents Act 1964.7

The Act's purposes were

first to shelter British

twofold,

shipowners from broad American

claims of jurisdiction and secondly, to give the English
government some leverage with which

to negotiate settle-

75

ments.

71.
Her Majesty's Government consider it contrary
to international comity that you or your officers
should be required, in answer to a subpoena couched
in the widest terms, to produce documents which
are not only not in the United States of America,
but which do not even relate to business in that
country.
Reprinted in ILA supra note 5, at 569.
An order from a
sovereign not to comply with a foreign court subpoena is
generally a valid defense for failure to produce the requested evidence.
72.
Re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry,
186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
73.
Reprinted in ILA supra note 5, at 404, 579, 582
(1964).
74.
Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act 1964,
c.87, repealed by Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980,
c.1l § 8.
75.
698 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1278 (1964).

The

Act authorized

forbid production
courts

or

fringe"

of

commercial

governmental

on

the British

information

agencies

if

English jurisdiction.

protection

to

British

subjects

Secretary

to do
It

of State

to foreign

so would

therefore

under the

to

act of

"inafforded

state

doc-

trine.
From
the
as

1964

United

States

the

diplomatic

the United

approach

front,

States and

shipowners.

data
7 6

it

eased.

American

the

The

to

the

Organization
arranged

an

FMC

desired

United

Westinghouse
British

calm

Electric

Company,

Rio

member of an

was a

the

was

to obtain

good

offices

FMC would

from

that

Lords had
to

such

in

the

to

Tinto

RTZ.

Zinc

78

case, arguing

The

to

by

(RTZ),

foreign
the

to

events.

First,

suit against

cartel.

the British
courts

RTZ

the

House

had

General

that English

a

7 7

testimony from

American

in-

procure

alleging that

British Attorney

strenuously

if the

jurisdiction.

two

uranium

elicit

the

foreign

not attempt

Ultimately,

decide whether

evidence.

shattered

international

directors of

between

to acquire

Corporation brought

Westinghouse attempted
English

issue.

for Economic

agreement

States agreed

their

voluntarily,

relative

courts,

increased

jurisdictional

by asserting claims of extraterritorial
The

between

other seafaring nations concerning

governments would use
formation

the

and Development

statistical

Britain

rhetoric

and Mannington Mills, evidenced

in their

Cooperation

confrontational

and Great

in Timberlane,

flexibility
On

to 1979,

a

of

right

intervened

sovereignty

76.
OECD, Restrictive Business Practices of Multinational Enterprises 61 passim (1942).
77.
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
(1978] A.C. 434.
See note 54 supra.
78.
In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547.

violated by a ruling to the contrary.

would be

79

The Westinghouse litigation highlighted several weaknesses of

the Shipping and Commercial Documents Act 1964,

most serious being the difficulty of proving an
ment" of British jurisdiction.
was not utilized by
directors'
by

"infringe-

For that reason the Act

the British government to block RTZ's

testimony, precipitating the need

for a decision

the House of Lords prohibiting the testimony on other

grounds. 80
A second reason for

renewed conflict

between the United

States and England again involved the shipping industry.

In

81

1978, Congress
exclude

passed a bill

which permitted the FMC to

a carrier from American ports for rebating on bills

of affreightment, a practice common to conference
President Carter vetoed

systems.

the bill, but a modified version was

82

enacted

in 1979.

Then,

in June of that year, a federal

grand jury indicted a number of individuals and British
shipping lines alleging various
tions. 83

Several

criminal antitrust viola-

defendants entered

to avoid having to defend the action.
the

maximum fines allowable. 8

4

pleas of nolo contendere
They were assessed

Subsequently, thirty private

79.
Id. at 589-95.
80.
The House of Lords held that the United States court's
investigation of the British company was a violation of
international law and contrary to the Evidence (Proceedings
in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, c.34 §§ l(b), 5(l)(b).
In
re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547, 616-7,
650-1.
The Law Lords were particularly concerned that information obtained in a civil action might be used by the
United States Department of Justice to initiate criminal antitrust actions against British corporations.
81.
Act of June 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-25, 1979 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News (93 Stat.) 71.
82.
46 U.S.C. §§ 815-842 (Supp. IV 1980).
83.
In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F.
Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
84. Id.

litigants filed triple damage actions
prosecution.

The British

government

based on the

original

protested

at

each

state

long history

of

confron-

85

of

the

proceeding.

These events,
tation

and

pelled

the

existence.

the election of
Protection

by

eight

took effect

sections.

Secretary may

British

trading

effected.

a conservative government,

of Trading

on

Interests

March 20,

Section

"overseas measures"

The

a

Act

1980

pro-

into

86

The act
into

coupled with

87

1 requires

to notify

prohibit

ping

Contracts and

that

dependence

1 is

a

is divided

persons

if

affected
of

re-enactment

"jurisdictional

that

adversely
of

Commercial Documents Act 1964,

upon

State.

he determines

be otherwise

virtual

It

the Secretary

compliance

interests would

Section

1980.

the Shipexcept

infringement"

is

elim-

inated.
Section 2 covers
formation.
with

The Secretary

"requirements"

85.

commercial

973 Parl.

8 8

by

Deb.,

of

State

foreign

H.C.

documents and

(5th

may forbid

courts

ser.)

other

in-

compliance

or authcrities

1538,

1551,

to

1589

(1979).
86.
See generally Gordon, supra note 3; Huntley, supra
note 67; Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 75 Am. J.
Int'l L. 257 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Lowe]; Note,
British Restrictions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 727 (1980).
87.
"Overseas measures" are defined as those "taken by
or under the law of any overseas country for regulation or
controlling international trade" if "they apply or would
apply to things done or to be done outside the territorial
jurisdiction of that country by persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom".
Protection of Trading Interests
Act 1980, c.11 § l(l)(a)-(l)(b).
88.
"Requirements" are defined as either a request or
demand from "a foreign court or authority addressed to a
person in the United Kingdom or demand to produce documents
or information to a person specified in the requirement."
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.l1
§ 2(5).

produce evidence if
diction of

located outside

the overseas authority.

the territorial juris-

89

Section 3 provides a maximum fine of

£I,00090 for

failure to comply with orders issued by the Secretary of
State pursuant to the

Act.

91

Section

3 does

not apply

to

"a person who is neither a citizen of the United Kingdom
and Colonies nor a body corporate incorporated in the
92

United Kingdom."
Section 4 supplements section 2 by superseding various
the Evidence

sections of
tions)

Act 1975. 9

3

(Proceedings in Other Jurisdic-

The thrust of section 4 is to ban pro-

duction of evidence in pre-trial discovery proceedings.
Section 5 forbids British courts from enforcing multiple damage awards

9 4

or compensatory antitrust judgments.

95

96
Claims for contribution to damages are also disallowed.
The section anticipates actions brought under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.
Section 6 is called the "clawback" provision.
tains

the most novel

viewpoint, the most
9 7

defendants'"

aspect of the Act and
controversial.

It con-

from the American

It allows "qualifying

to recover damages paid either voluntarily or

89.
Section 2 was designed to stop so-called "fishing
expeditions", i.e., wide ranging requests for information
and documents in the hope that a violation will be revealed.
See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp.,
[1956] 1 All E.R. 549.
90.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 3(4).
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 3(3).
91.
92.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.i1 § 3(2).
93.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975, c.34.
94.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(3).
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(4).
95.
96.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 5(2).
97.
"Qualifying defendants" are defined as, "citizens of
the United Kingdom or its territories, a body incorporated
therein, or a person conducting business in the United KingProtection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6(3).
dom."

by attachment

against

property

pursuant

to a

foreign judg-

98
ment.

Section 6

element of
the

a

any award

successful

tribution.
triple

9 9

It

damage award
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the

recoverable directly
third

from

party entitled
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to a

foreign
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from
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the

distain

either
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con-

has

paid

recover
foreign

jurisdiction.

of British

bill's pendency

that

theory under

Although

non-compensatory

British

judgment

section

American

entitled

the

of

Section

6
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the

urged

to

a

a clear manifestation

triple damage

be
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plaintiff may have
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plaintiff or a
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fears

Parliament

eliminated.

government stated,
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undo
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6 be
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do
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not understand
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[should
done."

court has

a United States
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countermeasures

1 00
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l1
the

Parliamentary

essentially
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Section 7
judgments
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section
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the

for

reciprocal

United Kingdom

enforcement of

that correspond
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to section

6

102
judgments.
to

In

enact similar

paid multiple
plaintiff

damage awards

8 is

section

legislation,

in other

Section
the

a sense,

than
the

or

to
in

7

invites other

allowing defendants
recover
addition

from a
to

Act's definitional

Shipping Contracts and

Commercial

countries
who have

multinational

the United
section.

Documents

Act

Kingdom.

It repeals
1964.103

98.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6
(6)(a)(b).
99.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 6(l).
100.
Diplomatic Note No. 56 at 6 (Nov. 9, 1979), reprinted
in Lowe, supra note 85, at 278.
101.
976 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1033 (1979).
102.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 7(1).
103.
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c.ll § 8(5).

B.

Australia

A plaintiff, seeking redress under United
trust

law against an Australian

must contend with two

States anti-

citizen or corporation,

"blocking statutes."

Discovery is governed by the Foreign Proceedings
104

(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976.
vests the Attorney General with

The Act

broad discretion to restrict

both oral testimony and documentary production before foreign tribunals.
trols

The Attorney General may institute con-

if he determines that an overseas court is asserting

jurisdiction or powers that are
national law,

inconsistent with inter-

the comity of nations or when he is convinced

that restrictions

are necessary

to protect national inter-

105

ests.

Judicial

is not possible.

review of

the Attorney General's decision

10 6

Judgments are regulated by the Foreign Antitrust Judg107

ments

(Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979.

the Attorney General has

Under it,

discretionary authority to modify

or prohibit enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments
Australia.
He must

in

Three conditions precedent limit that power.

be satisfied that either the

judgment was (1) rend-

ered in a manner inconsistent with international law or
comity, or

(2) that acquiescence to or enforcement of the

judgment would prejudice Australian domestic commercial

104.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976), as amended by Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act,
No. 202, Austl. Acts (1976), as implemented by
Order of the
Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S 214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
105.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976) § 4(l).
106.
Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act No. 121, Austl. Acts (1976) § 4(2).
i07.
Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act No. 13, Austl. Acts (1979).

interests,
the

or

(3)

that

judgment would

complete

jeopardize

or partial

Australian

recognition

of

international

trading interests.
In late

1981,

(Prohibition of

an

amendment

Certain

to

the

Evidence) Act

Foreign Proceedings
1976

was introduced

108
in

the

Australian Parliament.

corporates a

"clawback"

provision

the British Act.

It would

recover

under a

sums

paid

Attorney

General

tralia.

The Attorney

decide

whether

forceable,
reduced

the

amount.

foreign

would also

judgment

recovery would

it

having

to

in

foreign

but

assets in

the proposed

English Act

go

only

in

the

Aus-

discretion

partially
limited

en-

the

not only

from

to

to a

further than

also

from

companies af-

Australia.

amendment

mirrors

providing reciprocal
citizens of

to

judgment if

have

be

in-

6 of

citizens

permitting recovery

plaintiff corporation,

procedures

is

bill

to section

Australian

The amendment would

Clause 6 of
the

similar

entirely unenforceable

General

by

5 of the

foreign antitrust

it

case

however,

filiated with

of

allow

foreign

in which

British Act,
a

deems

Clause

section 7

enforcement

countries with

corres-

ponding legislation.
Currently,
the

Australian

seeking
for
fore

C.

"an

the

Attorney General

agreement which

consultation
court

United States

about

the

proceedings are

Department

are

[will]

of Justice

conducting
lay

national

down the

and

negotiations
framework

interests involved

be-

'10 9

started."

Canada

Under

a 1976

amendment

to

the

Combines

Investigation

108.
Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Amendment Bill No. 150 (1981).
109.
Huntley, supra note 67, at 233, quoting Financial
Times, Oct. 6, 1980.

110

Act,

1923,

the Canadian

Restrictive Trade Practices Com-

mission is authorized to order Canadian
specific

citizens to

ignore

foreign laws or judgments on grounds of national

interest.

The Commission determines which foreign laws or

judgments are counter to Canadian affairs.
The Canadian provinces have concurrent

legislative

capacity with respect to foreign discovery requests and
111

judgment

enforcement.

blocking statutes.
In 1981,

Several have enacted their own

1 12

a bill was introduced

in the Canadian Parlia-

113

ment.

It strongly resembles the British Protection of

Trading Interests Act 1980.
authorize

3 of

the bill would

the Attorney General to forbid or limit

duction of records
control

Clause

the

pro-

located either in Canada or under the

of a Canadian

citizen if, in his opinion,

closure would seriously compromise

such dis-

Canadian interests.

Failure to comply with the Attorney General's order would
give rise

to criminal liability under clause 6.

Clause 5 affords additional assurance

that records

subject to a clause 3 order will not be produced by allowing Canadian courts to
satisfied

seize and store

that the order might not

Enforcement of
subject to clause 7.

be obeyed.

foreign antitrust
Like

such records if

judgments would be

the Australian

bill, recognition

or enforcement would be contingent

upon a determination

the

commercial interests

Attorney General

would not
eral

that Canadian

be endangered thereby.

by

Should the Attorney Gen-

rule otherwise, the entire judgment could

not

be

110.
Section 31.5 Can. Stat. 1914-75-76 c.76.
111.
Section 92(14) British North American Act 1867.
112.
See, e.g., Business Records Protection Act, (1947)
Ont. Stat. c.l0. (codified at
Ont. Rev. Stat. c.54).
113.
Bill c-41 (1981).

enforced in Canada.
Clause 8 would enable Canadian citizens and corporations to recover any amount
clared void under clause

paid pursuant to a judgment de-

7.

Citizens or corporations with

substantial connections to the country in which the
was rendered would be excluded.
permit

judgment

The bill also proposes

to

Canadian courts to order the seizure and sale of

securities of any Canadian corporation in which the

entity

against whom recovery under clause 8 has been awarded has
either a direct or beneficial interest.

D.

The Netherlands

In 1956,

the Dutch enacted the Economic Competition

114

Act.

Under article 39,

an exemption must be obtained

from the Minister of Economic Affairs before Dutch citizens can comply with foreign

laws regulating commercial

competition.
The article was drafted specifically to counter enforcement of American antitrust law as applied in
Netherlands.

the

It has been invoked only against the United

11 5

States.
The Minister has authority to grant general,
conditional

exemptions.

antitrust laws or

Willful

compliance with

foreign

proceedings absent an exemption is a mis-

demeanor under the Economic Crimes Act.

E.

partial or

1 16

France

In 1968, France enacted

114.
(amended
115.
116.

legislation preventing its

Wet Economishe Mededinging (June 28, 1956) Stb.
June 29, 1977).
See Pettit & Styles, supra note 3, at 711.
Wet Economishe Delieten, arts. 6, 7, 8.
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governments

furnishing commercial

if

to

do

so

would

information to

threaten national

foreign

economic

117
interests
aimed

at

Federal
An

or

sovereignty.

thwarting
Maritime
amendment

The

1968

investigations

law

by the

was

primarily

United

States

Commission.
to

the

statute became

law

on July

16,

118
1980.

It

commercial

Article
under which

defined

1 sets

to

foreign

forth
be

"which would
economic

the

persons.

threaten

Information
the

interests

types

of

119

prohibition and

enforced.

by government

virtually all

investigative agencies,

juridical

or

natural

it will

or essential
as

disclosure of

information

tribunals or

disclosed

forbids

the

criteria

may

not

sovereignty,

of France

authorities to

or

the

be

security,

public
extent

order,
deemed

necessary. ,,120
Article
for

bis

"information of an

financial
tion

1 --

or

bars

requests

economic,

technical nature,

in writing

commercial,

intended

of

evidence

in

connection

foreign

judicial

or

administrative

with

for

or otherwise

industrial,
the constitu-

pending or prospective
proceedings."

1 2 1

117.
Law No. 68-678, [1968] J.0. 7267.
The law's original purpose was to block investigations by the FMC; it
was later utilized to protect French industry as a whole.
The statute complemented the French reservation to the Hague
Convention of 1968, under which letters of request for pretrial discovery are not given effect.
118.
Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799.
A translation of
the statute's title reads:
"Laws Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons."
Herzog, The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Herzog].
See also Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15
Int'l Law 585 (1981).
119.
Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 1.
120.
Id.,
translated in
Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.
121.
Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 1-bis,
translated in
Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.

Under article 2, persons receiving requests
for

or orders

information from a foreign tribunal are required to

notify the relevant ministry immediately.

12 2

Criminal penalties are sanctioned under
Fines and prison sentences are authorized

article 3.

for any viola-

tion of article 1, however, no penalties are provided for
violations of

article 2.123

Article 3's legislative history suggests that the
drafters felt that the possibility of criminal
could

be u'ed by French defendants

justify invocation of the

liability

in the United States to

Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution as a defense for failure

to produce

12 4

requested evidence.
The legislation was enacted hastily and

is criticized

125

as

being ambiguous.

tory construction will

Judicial and administrative statube necessary before the full scope

of the law becomes apparent.

F.

West Germany

German law prohibits execution of foreign requests
testimony or documents without prior authorization

for

by the

126

Federal Minister of Justice.
or otherwise condition the

The Minister may restrict

extent of disclosure allowed.

To date, no ordinances granting permission have
The de facto
appears.

been issued.

ban on disclosure is not as harsh as it

In 1976, the United States and West Germany agreed

122.
Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 2.
Law No. 80-538, [1980] J.0. 1799, art. 3.
123.
But see Societe Internationale pour Participan124.
tions Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958).
125.
See, e.g., Herzog, supra note 117, at 383.
OLG MUnchen, Beschluss vom 31. 10.80, 9 VA 3/80.
126.

to consult
tion.

G.

1 27

one another prior to making requests
That agreement is proving

for informa-

to be quite workable.

Italy

Generally, foreign discovery procedures will not be
given effect in Italy unless they comport with Italian
rules of civil or criminal
professional

procedure.

Additionally, certain

groups cannot be compelled to reveal

confi-

dential information obtained during the course of their
128

employment.

These include:

attorneys,

public officials,

public employees, clerics, and physicians.
By recent legislative enactment, 1 2
honor foreign demands

for commercial

9

shipowners cannot

documents or other

maritime information, unless authorized to do so by the
Minister of Justice.
Foreign judgments deemed contrary to Italian
policy,

are not recognized or enforced

in Italy.

public
Non-

compensatory damage awards are not considered in accord with
Italian

principles of

justice.

triple damages could not,

An American

therefore,

judgment for

be executed in Italy,

although a "clawback" recovery would, theoretically,

be

possible.

H.

South Africa

Commercial information in any form cannot be divulged
to a foreign

tribunal or litigant without prior

consent by

127.
Executive Agreement between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany (Agreement on Restrictive
Business Practices) June 23, 1976, United States -- Federal
Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
128.
C.P.C., art. 249; C.P.P., arts. 351, 352.
129.
Act (No. 488) of July 24, 1980.

the Minister of Economic
mission is also required
enforced in South Africa.

V.

Affairs. 1

30

The Minister's per-

before a foreign

judgment can be

1 31

Conclusion

Ancient principles of sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction provide

inadequate frameworks in which

to resolve

modern disputes among nations with conflicting economic
regulatory schemes.

Traditional concepts ignore the econo-

mic interdependence of states.
ity,

for example,

The self-restraint of com-

is insufficiently defined to effectively

control the problems

of concurrent

jurisdiction posed by

modern multinational corporations.
Extraterritorial enforcement of American antitrust law
has brought these

issues into sharp international focus.

The foreign statutory response has been extraordinary.
Despite almost universal
yet to abandon

condemnation, the United States has

its evangelical embrace of antitrust enforce-

ment. 132
Admittedly,
sensitivity to

there is evidence of increased American

the international repercussions involved.

The federal courts,

as in Timberlane and Mannington

13 3

Mills,

130.
Protection of Business Act, No. 99 of 1978, as
amended by
Protection of Business Amendment Act, No. 114 of
1979.
131.
Id.
132.
In a recent address, the Director of Planning of the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice,
expressed surprise that other nations have not emulated the
American approach.
Joel Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust:
an American View, Address to the International Chamber of
Commerce, Paris, March 12, 1981.
133.
The United States Departments of State and Justice
have requested federal courts to encourage foreign governments to file amicus curiae briefs in antitrust litigation
involving their nationals.

are

beginning to recognize the need to weigh political and

international issues before deciding the merits of
transnational antitrust case.
proach is simply

inadequate.

each

But a judicial ad hoc apBalancing legal,

political

and foreign policy considerations along with the economic
consequences both here and abroad is beyond
of even the most

sophisticated federal judge.

If meaningful

solutions are to be achieved, a new

"general theory of economic sovereignty" 134
developed.
lateral

the competency

should be

Diplomatic negotiations resulting in either bi-

treaties

or international conventions

1 35

offer the

best solution.
There are signs that
that direction.

the United States is moving in

Attorney General William French Smith re-

cently stated:
We do not wish through our laws or their enforcement to impair the sovereignty or rights of other
We do not wish to police the world and
nations.
proscribe foreign conduct merely because it fails
Nevertheless, we
to conform to our interests.
intend to influence the conduct of those international activities that have a foreseeable and
substantial impact on the legitimate concerns of
In many instances, we trust that
our people.
multilateral or bilateral accords can ensure due
interregard for our own interests as well as1 3 the
6
ests of other governments and peoples.
Until agreements are concluded, continued American
attempts to extraterritorially enforce United States

134.
Lowe, supra note 85, at 281.
135.
The United Nations, through the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) and the
Commission on Transnational Corporations are striving to
One objective
generate an international code of principles.
is to control international restrictive business practices.
U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, Intergovernmental Working Group Report on the Formulation of a Code of
Conduct, 16 Int'l Legal Mats. 709 (1977).
136.
Address by Attorney General, the Honorable William
French Smith, to the 29th Congress of the Union Internationale
des Avocats in New York, August 31, 1981, reprinted in Pettit
& Styles, supra note 3, at 715.

antitrust law will spawn new and more extensive foreign
statutory enactments.

Agreements are necessary to guide

both the judiciary and our trading partners away from the
confrontational rhetoric of the
reasoned approach

past and

toward a more

to antitrust enforcement.
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